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LANGUAGE THEORY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
David Paxman
Brigham Young University
In Emile. or On Education, Rousseau took a firm position
against the teaching of languages to young people:
I agree that if the study of languages were only the
study of words--that is to say, of figures or the
sounds which express them--it could be suitable for
children. But in changing the signs, languages also
modify the ideas which these represent. Minds are
formed by languages; in each language the mind has its
particular form. (109)
Implicit in Rousseau's injunction is a set of assumptions
and principles concerning language and its power to shape
thought.
In this paper, I would like to investigate these
assumptions and principles in the eighteenth century as they
relate to the formation and perpetuation of national
character. Even though a significant body of scholarship
exists on theories of national character and on the
manifestation of national types in literature, little work
exists, as far as I have been able to determine, on
relationships between these and language theory in the
century. Yet this was the century in which it first became
possible to link them systematically.
As it may appear, my purpose will be largely descriptive,
but along the way I hope to make it apparent that language
thinkers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
were working out the implications of their understanding of
the nature and workings of language in three ways: 1)
identifying the elements of language that reflected
distinctive national traits, 2) defining the manner in which
those elements reflected character, and 3) determining which
arose first, a people's traits or its language choices which
then helped create its traits.
In relation to the first, we
will see that in the period covered here, language elements
reflecting national character were first identified
primarily as words, then as words and syntactical
structures, and finally as a nebulous force or spirit
infusing both of these.
In relation to the second, we will
see that defining the mechanism by which language revealed
character was generally problematic, but that thinkers
availed themselves of the doctrine of association of ideas
as a key link between language and group identity.
In
relation to the third, we will see that one figure who
thought deliberately about the problem of causal priority,
wilhelm von Humboldt, recognized the effect language had in
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shaping individual thought but found it much more difficult
to specify how language created national character than to
specify how national character determined language
differences.
I would like to begin by running quickly through a series of
viewpoints from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, and then I will turn attention to more profound
and sophisticated concepts linking national character and
language in the writings of the Abbe Condillac and Wilhelm
von Humboldt. That seventeenth-century thinkers perceived
connections between language and nationality cannot be
doubted, even though the basis for those connections was not
articulated and the connections themselves smacked less of
linguistic features than of economic and political
prejudice. Certainly, for centuries, writers had taken note
of the obvious--the French, the Germans, the Italians not
only exhibited distinctive national traits, but they spoke
languages which partook of those traits.
Language was, if
not the rough equivalent of nationality, at least part of
the equation. A national language was treasured as part of
the make-up of a people, something to be refined, protected.
Indeed, as Thomas Sprat observed, the fate of a nation was
intimately tied to the state of its language: "The purity of
Speech, and greatness of Empire have in all countries, still
met together" (41).
Language was therefore linked not only to national
character, but to national destiny.
It offered itself as
both resource and weapon in the struggle for literary,
philosophical, or scientific preeminence. A nation's
language offered a sort of scheme for understanding the
nature of things and a more--or less--apt vehicle for the
elegant expression of external nature and human experience.
To Sprat, speaking for the newly founded Royal Society in
1667, it was no accident that experimental science had taken
root and was beginning to branch in England.
Character and
language lent themselves to the task as a gloved hand.
Morose as they might seem to the effete French and Italians,
the English were ideally suited for advances in practical
knowledge, a hardy people of straight-forward, unequivocal
communication. And although he did not assert it in so many
words, it is apparent that Sprat believed English offered
the ideal vehicle for scientific discourse. Sprat's
critique of eloquence and its dangers to scientific
advancement, can, in light of commonplace views of
Continental languages, be read as much as a critique on them
as on eloquence. The English, said Sprat, combined the
"middle qualities, between the reserved subtle southern, and
the rough unhewn Northern people," but he might as well have
been describing their language.
Addison devoted Spectator No. 135 to the relations between
language and national character in a way that illustrates

30

once again the strength of the bonds perceived between the
two, but the relative lack of systematic inquiry into the
bonds. The links Addison perceives are mostly at the word
and not structure level and show more the imprint of the
people on their language than of language on people.
"I
have read somewhere," he wrote, "of an eminent Person who
used in his private Offices of Devotion, to give Thanks to
Heaven that he was Born a Frenchman: For my own part I look
upon it as a peculiar Blessing that I was Born an
Englishman. Among many other Reasons, I think myself very
happy in my Country; as the Language of it is wonderfully
adapted to a Man who is sparing of his Words, and an Enemy
to Loquacity." English suits the English because its
abundance of monosyllables "gives us an Opportunity of
delivering out Thoughts in few sounds." In other instances,
such as in the tendency to eliminate the vowel and therefore
the syllable from the past tense (e.g. drown'd instead of
drowned) and the practice of forming contractions, the
English have left the imprint of their character upon their
tongue.
"This indeed takes off from the Elegance of our
Tongue, but at the same time expresses our Ideas in the
readiest manner."
Mandeville, who recognized how difficult it was to achieve
impartiality in comparing the beauties of different
languages (2:297), yet valued English in several ways that
were intimately tied to the genius of the its speakers.
First off, in avoiding excessive gestures and bawling
intonations, the English paid each other the compliment of
speaking to engage the reason more than the passions.
"I
can't help thinking," says Cleomenes in the Sixth Dialogue
of the Fable of the Bees, "but that, next to the Laconick
and manly Spirit, that runs through the Nation, we are very
much beholden for the Strength and Beauty of our Language to
this Tranquility of Discourse, which has been in England,
more than anywhere else, a Custom . • "(2:292). He seems
to have drawn this idea directly from Guy Miege's Present
State of Great Britain (1707). Second, English
distinguished itself as a vehicle for communicating
substance. Echoing a common sentiment, Mandeville
differentiated the traits of English from those of other
languages. He charged that French was a very persuasive
language, at least insofar as one's purpose was to coax or
wheedle or talk of food and drink.
In French, the most
valued expressions were those that soothed or tickled; in
English, those that pierced or struck (2:297).
If his
judgment was partial, Mandeville didn't know "how to be
sorry for it."
"I don't think it amiss, that Men should be
inclined to love their own Language, from the same
Principle, that they love their Country" (2:297).
Johann David Michaelis wrote his Dissertation upon the
Influence of Opinions on Language. and of Language on
Opinions in response to a prize essay topic of the Berlin
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Academy. Part of the background for his work was the debate
in the 1750s over the choice of language to be favored in
the lectures and publications of the Academy, with
Maupertuis and others favoring French. Michaelis' essay
attempted to rise above nationalistic panegyrics and to
assess, as the title describes, how language and thought
shape each other. with the known differences even in
European languages, it was impossible for Michaelis to avoid
suggesting connections between these and the character of a
people.
In fact, this study was the first to imply in its
central question such connections. Unfortunately, Michaelis
did not avail himself of the work of Condillac which had
been written over a decade earlier and which I will shortly
discuss. His work marks the furthest point to which the
investigation could be carried without recourse to Lockean
principles of mind and some understanding of the syntactical
principles of language.
Michaelis suggested two ways in which language and "opinion"
influenced each other. Opinion influenced language in that
a people named only things they perceived to be worthy of
naming and only in that aspect from which people perceived
them:
"by this appearance it is, that the names we give
[objects] . . . are ever regulated." And: "It is from the
opinions of the people and the point of view, in which
objects appear to them, that language receives its form"
(2). As new words were coined to name new ideas, or old
ideas in new light, these words joined the language by a
kind of social process.
"Thus it is that thousands of men
become contributors to that immense heap of truths and
errors, of which the languages of nations are the
repositories" (3).
In relation to abstract and metaphysical
ideas, a language was useful only insofar as it had "gone
through philosophic hands." Otherwise it would be full of
the errors of ignorant people attempting to account for the
world but merely reducing it to the proportions of their own
blindness. Michaelis pointed out, for instance, that the
Ethiopians, "having but one word for nature and person,
could not distinguish those two things in the controversy
concerning Christ's two natures" (5).
By a reciprocal process, language influenced opinion. A
copious language, for example, stimulated perception.
Where a language is rich it imports a tincture of
knowledge even to the common man: things become known
to him, which without the assistance of his language
he would even have remained ignorant of; he observes
the course of nature better, and finds himself capable
of communicating experiments to the more learned,
which otherwise would have been lost. (22)
But to enjoy to the benefits of one's language in this way
required that one know the language well. Peasants lacking
full knowledge of their own tongue live in more than
economic poverty: "they walk about in the fields, amidst a
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rich display of nature's various productions, but they are
blind, and are so only for want of fit words to distinguish
the productions" (24-25).
Michaelis waffled on an important question we would call
cultural diversity. He recognized, as the above passages
show, that languages contained very different senses of what
existed in the world and how it was all related.
Languages
differed even more so in abstract terminology. At the same
time, he expressed little tolerance for differences from
what he perceived as a norm of truth. All languages, in his
view, perpetuated both truth and error. But he showed
little hesitation in pronouncing upon specific points of
error and suggesting ways in which language could avoid
them.
Perhaps this confidence was related to his faith in
learning.
Learning liberated people from the errors of
language: "The noxious influences of a language, but little
affect the man of true learning. Generally speaking, they
are such only to the ignorant, to persons of superficial
knowledge, to the learned of a contracted genius" (74).
In
the final analysis, then, Michaelis undid the relations
between language and the character of a people insofar as
its learned members were concerned. Yet at other points he
confessed that many errors contained in language escaped
notice entirely (otherwise they would no longer be errors).
It would require "some philosophical genius . . . equally a
master of some remote language, as the Chinese, as of
European tongues" to unravel the strands (71).
If Michaelis carried the inquiry into relations between
nations and languages as far as it would go at the word
level, the Abbe Condillac, writing a decade and a half
earlier, laid the groundwork for these relations at the
level of mental processes and linguistic structures.
"Every
language expresses the character of the people that speak
it," he said in Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge
(1746; English, 1756:285). As I have already mentioned, one
finds this opinion nearly everywhere.
Condillac drew on
principles of psychology to explain how it was so.
In the
section of the Essay devoted to "The Character of
Languages," Condillac treated language as a product of the
character of its speakers; however, much material also
suggests the reciprocal relationship, that national
character is also partly the result of language.
I will
want to examine each side of this relationship because it
defines the first clearly articulated rationale for the
widely adopted position that language indeed helped create
and perpetuate national character.
The theoretical foundations were set down by Locke.
Condillac, in fact, subtitled his Essay "A Supplement to Mr.
Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding." Locke had argued
that individuals and peoples constructed language as a
convenience in communicating their ideas to one another and

..
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that languages differed in their terms because different
groups had different needs. Each language therefore
contained words that could not be translated directly into
others.
In fact, even individuals differed in the way they
assigned words to name ideas, and therefore language was
ultimately a private thing. Especially in arriving at
general, complex, and what Locke called "mixed-mode" ideas,
people were apt to differ from each other because they
constructed these ideas from simpler ones, combining them in
ways that did not exist in nature. General terms and
abstractions are absolutely necessary. A people couldn't
have a name for every single tree or "every Crow that flies
overhead," for example, but nature itself did not dictate
where the boundaries between species would be fixed.
Much
less did the external world offer a pattern for terms such
as "justice," "adultery," "fratricide," "corporeity," and so
forth.
These names stand for bundles of ideas that seem
worth differentiating to one people but not, perhaps, to
another.
Implicit in this set of theories, we find a provocative
basis for links between language and national character.
Language recorded, especially in its abstract and general
terms, the unique bundles of ideas and associations that a
people saw as necessary to discourse about themselves
individually, their society, and the external world they
inhabited.
Locke did not foresee, however, how his theories
could be used to show that language in turn exerted an
influence on the way a people thought about themselves and
the external world.
Locke devoted most of his analysis at word level and did not
suggest how the syntactical relations of language arose.
However, his principle of association of ideas suggested to
Condillac a way in which a people's character would be
reflected in their language at both word and syntactical
levels.
Condillac confronted the question: what caused a
person, and, by extension, a society, to associate ideas in
a particular way? The answer, finally, was "interest"--that
is, an implicit understanding of the way particular clusters
of ideas will serve the individual who associates them in a
characteristic manner. This principle may be used to
explain not only why words differ, but how even word orders
and grammatical relationships--assumed by the principles of
universal grammar to reflect distinctions and operations of
the mind--may preserve the interests of a language group.
In The Art of Writing, Condillac acknowledged the difficulty
of defining literary qualities such as "elegance" and "the
poetic style" because of the ways these differed not only
from great writer to great writer and genre to genre, but
from nation to nation. The explanation for the differences
is the association of ideas. These differ "with the spirit
of the nations who, having different usages, customs, and
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characters, would not know how to agree to associate all
their ideas in the same manner" (400).
The principle of association of ideas not only explained how
syntactical relations might encode a people's way of
thinking, it also could explain how language itself
influenced national character. Condillac observed that
signs were necessary to thought and therefore conditioned
it. A people's language reflected its character, but it
also produced that character generation after generation.
By habit--that is, by growing accustomed to the constraints
imposed by the terms and syntax of a language-- speakers
learned to associate ideas in a manner that appeared natural
to them.
"We are naturally accustomed to connect our ideas
according to the genius of our mother tongue," he said in
the Essay (271). with this thought, we are led to
Rousseau's injunction against teaching other languages to
children before their own thinking had taken the shape of
their native tongue. Said Rousseau, "Minds are formed by
languages; in each language the mind has its particular
form.
This is a difference which might very well be a part
of the cause or of the effect of national characters; and
what appears to confirm this conjecture is that in all the
nations of the world language follows the vicissitudes of
morals and is preserved or degenerates as they are" (109).
We shall now turn our attention to Wilhelm von Humboldt as
the end point of this study--not because he represents the
end of inquiry into national character and language, but for
two other reasons.
First, Humboldt recognized one of the
problems inherent in the eighteenth-century handling of this
issue and tried to address it, though without final
resolution. This was the problem of priority of cause: did
national character create the distinctive features of
language, or did language choices taken by the earliest
founders of nations prescribe the path of development of the
their characters? Which came first? Second, Humboldt
represented a new phase in the intellectual struggle to
locate the nature or character of languages themselves in
that he posited the existence of this character at a level
beneath, but manifested in, the outer (phonetic) and inner
(grammatical and syntactical) forms of language.
Humboldt's writings on language and national character are
scattered among papers, essays, and fragments, some of which
he never completed or published. As Hans Aarsleff has
noted, Humboldt was continually working on his immense
language projects but often left them unfinished. He
synthesized and integrated most of his views, however,
before his death in 1835 in the work just mentioned, which
he designed as the introduction to On the Kawi Language on
the Island of Java. Aarsleff points to the centrality of
the language-nation relationship in Humboldt's project: His
papers "were read with interest and engagement in Paris and
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in North America by scholars who shared Humboldt's focus on
non-European languages and the philosophical orientation
that made it the primary aim of language study to relate
languages to the mentalities of their speakers" (x-xi).
Humboldt acknowledged the elusive nature of the character of
languages. To some degree the distinctive bent of each
language "is only sensed and cannot be represented" (GS
4:421; Manchester 109). Elusive though it may be, however,
it could be approached. We have already seen that the
character of a language may be located at word or structure
level. Humboldt held that even at word level, even with the
same general referents for words from different languages,
the individuality of each language emerges. The apparently
translatable words actually mean slightly different things
in context:
Thinking never treats an object isolated, and never
uses it in the whole of its reality.
It merely skims
off relationships, conditions and viewpoints, and
interconnects them . . . and it may therefore
justifiably be said that even with respect to
completely sensuous objects the words of various
languages are not perfect synonyms, and that those who
say hippus, eguus, and Pferd do not say throughout and
completely the same thing. (GS 3:170; Manchester 107)
If the character of a language manifests itself in the
precise nature of what is named by its words, it also, of
course, does so in the structure, for that dictates the
manner in which named ideas relate one to another. To
describe exactly how that character takes shape in structure
eluded Humboldt, but he was certain that the force of
character was in some sense prior to both the "outer form"
(phonetic structure) and the "inner form" (syntactic and
semantic structure). The opening passage of his chapter on
the character of languages in The Diversity of Human
Language-structure declared:
The grammatical framework of language, as we have so
far broadly surveyed it, and its external structure in
general, by no means exhaust its nature, however, and
its true character still depends upon something far
more subtle, more deeply hidden and less accessible to
analysis. (148)
Indeed, the most basic link that language provides between
our ideas of things and sounds is a mysterious thing which
yet contains the subtle strands of individual character.
"We can split up concepts, dismember words, as far as we are
able," he wrote,
and we still get no closer to the secret of how the
thought actually couples with the word.
In their most
primal relation to the nature of individuality,
therefore, language and the basis of all nationality
have a direct resemblance to one another. (153)
Even languages of similar structure are known to have
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differences of character.
Sanscrit, Greek, and Latin have a system of wordconstruction and word-ordering that is closely related
and on many points the same. But everyone feels the
difference of their individual character, which is not
just a national characteristic becoming visible in the
language, but, deeply rooted in the languages
themselves, determines the specific make-up of each.
(149)
As the above passage makes clear, language itself takes on a
character beyond the mere imprint of national
characteristics. It then becomes an independent force on
the minds of its users, in some ways constraining and
hampering what Humboldt called "the free and independent
operation of the intelligence" (149). The character of a
language is like a spirit which "takes up its abode in the
language and animates the latter like a body it has
produced" (153).
If language affects national character, as these passages
imply, then one may fairly ask which occurred first, the
imprint of a group's character on its language, or the
effect of even their initial utterances on their traits as a
group. And one may ask, in the developing nature of nations
and language, which effect is stronger? Humboldt is
unequivocal on one point--the effects are reciprocal. That
is, each operates on the other.
In addressing the question
of priority of causation, we must accept a distinction
Humboldt made between the early and later stages of
language.
In the earlier, a great abundance of alternative
forms presented themselves in the minds of humans struggling
to express their thoughts. The very play of opportunities
and forms and the "stimulus of success, engenders and
sustains their creative power" (148). The succeeding stage
is one of crystallization, when certain forms dominate and
the language becomes, "in effect, a finished product" (148).
The analysis of these two stages, and the remark that in the
second stage language acquires character, have led Martin
Manchester to conclude that "the character of a language is
the result of influences operating upon it in its formative
period" and that "the doctrine of a 'double character'" (the
reciprocal effects of language and national traits) "is
relevant not to the initial formation of languages, but only
to the subsequent evolution of new languages out of old
ones" (111). Manchester seems to have overlooked the caveat
Humboldt offered in describing the two states:
"It would be
a great mistake, however, to suppose that what I have here
kept sharply separate for purposes of clear distinction, is
equally distinct in Nature" (157). It is true that the mind
operates more freely in the earliest stages of language
formation and that therefore, in making choices, the mind
leaves its imprint more freely on language than does
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language leave its mark on the mind.
But if it is true, as
Humboldt asserts, that the "mode of thinking or sensing in a
people . • . is already at work upon [language] from the
very outset" (149), and that consciousness itself is
integrally tied to language, then it is also true from what
we have reviewed that the reciprocal effect is at work. The
most thoughtful position would, therefore, be this one: that
in the earliest stages the effects of group traits dominate
over the effects of language on the group, but that in some
sense language choices and traits are synonymous and
inseparable.
At the later stage, the language may, in fact, become a kind
of intellectual prison.
If the nation submits to its
language without spending creative energies on its
development, the nation's collective intellect stagnates:
"The language, as it were, outgrows the mind, and the
latter, in its own languor, having ceased to be selfcreative, plays an increasingly empty game with idioms and
forms of language that originated from truly meaningful use"
(150). One way a people may keep refreshing their language
and minds is to remain alert to the "region that transcends
language, and is actually constricted by language" yet for
which "language in turn is the only means of exploring and
fertilizing" (157).
"If the feeling truly awakens in the
soul," said Humboldt, "that language is not just a medium of
exchange for mutual comprehension, but a true world which
the mind must insert, by its own inner labour, between
itself and objects, then it is on the right road towards
continually finding more and depositing more in its
language" (157).
I have reviewed some major contributors to the discussion of
language and national character with focus on the elements
of language that reflect that character, the mechanisms or
means by which it does so, and the problem of mutual
causality.
I would like to conclude by pointing out that
discourse on this topic was being conducted with broader and
broader concepts. What began as common-sense linkages
between national traits and language eventually took into
account both rational and non-rational mental processes.
with Humboldt, discourse on langauge and national character
set its foundations in the three concepts of language,
consciousness, and cUlture--concepts that gave universality
and profundity to the discussion. At the same time, this
very universality made specificity difficult. Discussion of
language and national character acquired all the profundity
of metaphysics but became detached from the study of
language itself.
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